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If Robert Sinnerbrink says that Giorgio Agamben is “a philosopher only
occasionally mentioned in contemporary film-philosophy” (Sinnerbrink
2015: 3), then Janet Harbord makes an important contribution
to correcting this oversight. Following hot on the heels of Asbjørn
Grønstad’s edited collection, Cinema and Agamben: Ethics, Biopolitics and
the Moving Image (Grønstad 2014), to which Harbord makes an important
contribution (Harbord 2014), Ex-Centric Cinema: Giorgio Agamben
and Film Archaeology offers a powerful and sustained application of
Agamben’s philosophy to cinema, exploring in particular how we can
mine cinema’s history in order to find new or different potentialities
regarding what cinema is, might be, and/or what it can do.
In her introduction, Harbord explains that to be “ex-centric” means
“reading the past as effective in the present” (p. 5), especially in the sense
that cinema’s forgotten histories or could-have-beens can still be felt and
still could more forcibly come into being. In this way, cinema must be
understood not just as a medium for recording events and fixing them
in an eternal state, but also as a medium of transmission, which can
bring about change. Indeed, Agamben argues that cinema is concerned
less with image than it is with gesture, since gesture is “the name for the
harnessing of the collapse of subjectivity and aesthetics, and cinema is
the aesthetic space in which this is most possible” (p. 8). That is, read as
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gesture, cinema can be understood as giving to us a sense of that which
is not alongside that which is, as per the supposedly crazed ravings of
Don Quixote (who, to paraphrase Miguel de Cervantes, felt that the
craziest thing of all is to see life as it is and not as it should be). In this way,
Harbord proposes that “ex-centric cinema” might be understood as a
“non-cinema” (p. 17) that accompanies the more official/institutionalised
cinema to which we most commonly are exposed.
Harbord turns her attention in the first chapter to cinematic glitches
and incompleteness, especially in relation to the quixotic Orson Welles.
She also charts how under the regime of science, human “[e]xperience is
discredited as a form of common and transmissible knowledge” (p. 32),
with the result being that “desire… becomes essentially insatiable” (p. 33).
If you will, an incomplete and fragmented (or human) understanding
of the world invites (human) imagination/fantasy to complete it. But
since fantasy is no longer considered real, fantasy cannot be fulfilled.
With fantasy discredited and unfulfilled, we live in a world without love,
but which is defined by fixity and individuality. Cinema in its ex-centric
sense, meanwhile, “shows us the waywardness of a desire to grasp
and keep anything of the passing moment… What cinema delivers are
fragments that may be assembled as partial things” (p. 47).
In Chapter 2, Harbord suggests the importance of tics and spasms as
the body becomes coded as opposed to unruly in the modern, capitalist
world. Considering Eadweard Muybridge, Harbord suggests that still
images are engrams that equally privilege transmission over recording
(p. 67), with the engram being “a trace of memory encoded and open
to future transmission across time, retaining a potential for reactivation
within the appropriate conditions” (p. 68). She continues: “[w]hilst
the pre-cinematic physiological sequences of photography exhibit a
body ostensibly brought under analytical control and made legible,
there is always a dimension that escapes this capture” (p. 69), with this
dimension often being female. If capital sees, after Roberto Esposito,
a shift from community to immunity (people separated from each
other and fearing contagion), then this chimes with the development
of film grammar as the codification of interiority (point of view, legible/
controlled character psychology), even if some, like Jean Epstein, see the
human interior as an enigma (p. 77). X-rays, therefore, take their place
as another technology/dispositif that has been co-opted into processes
of immunity rather than community. Nonetheless, Harbord affirms,
gesture, the gag and dancing all retain the potential for developing new
communities.
Harbord opens Chapter 3 by looking at Rania Stephan’s found footage
film, Les trois disparitions de Soad Hosni (Lebanon/France, 2011), in which
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cinema becomes “an apparatus that functions through what Agamben
describes as two transcendental terms provided by montage: to arrest the
image (stoppage) and to replay it (repetition), and here resides cinema’s
ability to deactivate the smooth flow of commodity images” (p. 102).
Glitches and the aged image mean that “the commodity is subjected
to the registration of its history, to contingency, finitude and decay”
(p. 103). Harbord then charts how Agamben’s view of pornography
has evolved from showing the possibility for community (e.g. via cross-
class relationships) to being melancholic (pornography as overwhelmed
by manipulated female bodies), before suggesting that the direct
look to camera can in pornography be defiant. As a result, “pornography
is the site where exhibition value and exchange value unite to exemplify
the smooth workings of the machine under the sign of the most
fabricated desire. And the returned look is but one more gesture captured
by the capitalist sensorium” (p. 121). Gesture under capital is thus
commodified, but Soad Hosni undermines this process because “the
material imperfection of the image renders inoperative the distinction
between recording and transmission. In the disclosure of material
imperfections, cinema draws attention to itself… The image loses its
lustre as commodity, but gains its historical and imperfect dimension”
(p. 124).
Chapter 4, which is an experimental chapter made up of 19 fragments,
suggests that cinema is akin to a laboratory, or a “mechanism that
imposes a separation, a machine for sifting matter into binary form:
inside/outside, society/nature, included/excluded” (p. 131). Salvaging
the role played in the development of film by Étienne-Jules Marey’s
assistant, Lucien Bull, who pioneered studies of insect flight, Harbord
reminds us how his work necessarily involved looking at intervals
and air. And it is in the intervals of cinema that ex-centric cinema can
break down the laboratory’s binarisms. For example, black leader is
“a darkness that refuses semiotic meaning and in this sense it stands
for all that is ex-centric, unlived and underdeveloped in cinema” (p. 135).
With Bull in mind, Chapter 5 considers other assistants and helpers,
or the Sancho Panzas of film history. Existing beyond cinema, or in
the paracinematic realm (p. 179), these assistants include Birt Acres
and William Kennedy-Laurie Dickson, who are not far removed from
the crackpot copyists in Gustave Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet (1881),
and close to HermanMelville’s impotent scrivener Bartleby from the 1853
story of the same name. In this way, Harbord invites us to remember
cinema’s failed inventions and failures, those moments in film history
that cinema-as-spectacle has obscured from view: “[t]he spectacle is
cinema made sacred and untouchable, purified of its glitches and
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stammers. The cinema of the assistants returns the image to the realm of
the profane… a profane cinema is one that has been touched and handled,
contaminated by human use” (p. 199).
Finally, Chapter 6 returns to x-rays and telescopes, which imaging
technologies ask us to peer inside the human, thereby helping to create
interiority and the concept of identity (p. 214). Centric cinema is a cinema
of control where identity is fixed and “[c]ontingency is lost” (p. 216).
Harbord, meanwhile, is invested in aggregating what is beyond cinema
and transmitting its potential: “[e]x-centric cinema trains possibility
in multiple ways: dormant in the apparatus and texts that exist, as
unfinished projects that refuse closure, and as the experiment without
truth, which is another way of describing the relation between potentiality
and impotentiality” (p. 231). Ex-centric cinema finds power in the
impotent, paradoxically in the “not taking place of cinema” (p. 226), or in
non-cinema (p. 206).
Sparkling with ideas, provocative, and beautifully written, Harbord’s
is a loving text that invites us not simply to consider the commodified
toys that cinema offers up, but also to play with the other materials
that accompany cinema, but which often are forgotten and/or left behind.
Like an infant playing not with the toy but with the cardboard box
in which it came, then, we might thereby discover true play – even if to do
so risks profaning the temple of cinema. But by mashing up cinema, new
flowers can emerge from the mud. In the new media/mud environment,
this may be what is happening anyway. To read Ex-Centric Cinema, then,
may be a key tool for helping us to understand the previously latent
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